ANZUS After Fifty Years – Parliament of Australia
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We hope in this way to present readers with an encapsulated summary of the alliance and the principal issues surrounding it after fifty years. It should not be assumed that the positions taken here for the sake of argument necessarily represent the detailed views of the authors. However, the episode is illustrative of Lord Palmerston's famous dictum, quoted at the head of this page, and provides a useful conceptual context for thoughts about Australia's most important major external connection.
In the American 'Great White Fleet', the US Atlantic fleet consisting of sixteen battleships and fourteen thousand sailors, visited Australia on its circumnavigation of the world. The fleet was greeted with great enthusiasm in the ports of Sydney and Melbourne before sailing to Western Australia.
Its visit had come at a time when Australians were concerned about Great Britain's alliance with Japan, renewed inand with the concentration of the Royal Navy in or near its home waters around Britain, seemingly leaving Australia bereft of immediate naval support for its defence. The Australian Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, initiated an approach to the Americans, finally persuading 'a reluctant British government to extend a formal invitation', 2 and using the visit to further the cause of establishing an Australian navy, separate from the Royal Navy.
The Australian population fulfilled the prophesy of President Teddy Roosevelt's naval aide, that 'the officers and men will barely escape with their lives from the hospitality of the people'.
President Roosevelt ordered that the visit of the Atlantic fleet should be in the 'character of a practice march'. Roosevelt felt it necessary to ascertain the sentiments of Australia and New Zealand. On a more practical level, Rear Admiral Sperry, the commander-in-chief of the fleet ordered that during the fleet's visits intelligence be gathered to compile war plans for the capture of New Zealand and Australian ports.
The hospitality of the local population undoubtedly made it easier for the fleet's officers to gain insight into Australia's strengths and weaknesses, and probably direct access to the information necessary to prepare plans to capture the new nation's major cities.
Once completed and approved by the fleet commander-in-chief and submitted to the US Department of the Navy, the plans appear to have spent the rest of the century in storage. How seriously should the preparation of these plans be taken as evidence of American intent? The friendliness of the welcome and the evident similarities between the two peoples made a positive impression on the fleet. The hospitality of the Australian authorities and the people was an indication of Australian sentiment towards the US, and the 'invasion plans' were apparently never updated.
With the benefit of hindsight, the uneven, even opposing motives behind the developing relationship between the visitors and their hosts is instructive when examining the Australian-American relationship and alliance in the latter half of the 20th century and beyond. It is indeed a reminder of Palmerston's wise advice that nations do not have permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent national interests.
The remainder of this paper deals with the benefits and costs of Australia's US relationship. Advantages and Benefits of the Alliance The ANZUS Treaty has contributed to a security environment and to circumstances which have meant that in the last half century Australia has not faced a direct threat to its security.
Through its alliance with the United States, Australia has also benefited from having preferential access to US intelligence, to US technology, and to the US military and government on a scale far greater than would appear appropriate for a country of Australia's size or power.
Popular support for the alliance in Australia indicates that the Treaty has also provided Australians with a sense of security which has had domestic benefits as well as benefiting the nation's regional relationships.
Some believed that NATO would wither without the Soviet threat, and so it might have, if its members had not-after some perilous hesitations-given it renewed credibility by their involvement in quelling Balkan conflicts. The case for a post Cold War Asia is somewhat different. Stephen Walt argues that lingering historical enmities in Asia and the absence of strong multilateral regional institutions have meant that Washington's bilateral security arrangements with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have 'offered both an impediment to regional competition and a hedge against a rising and increasingly assertive China'.
The Historical Relevance of the Alliance to Australia Europeans in Australia have always felt the need to look to a great and powerful ally for protection. Pre-Federation and until World War II, the Australian colonies and the nascent nation depended on Great Britain and its navy for defence and Australia considered itself as independent within the framework of the Empire.
This dependence and need to belong were quite unremarkable given what Coral Bell describes as Australia's 'essential strategic dilemma', that is, a small population wanting to maintain its primarily Western identity 'on the fringe of a society of [Asian] giants'.
Successive Australian colonial and federal governments have viewed 'the national situation as inherently one of long term insecurity. It found this dependence hard to resist when given the opportunity in the early s to negotiate a treaty which would secure the United States to supplement or replace Britain as an ally, especially as the US had proved so able and useful an ally in comparison to Britain during World War II when Australia was under direct threat.
Australia was represented at the negotiations for the ANZUS Treaty by External Affairs Minister Percy Spender who used the United States' desire for a non-punitive treaty with Japan to get the Americans to agree, albeit reluctantly, to enter into a security agreement with Australia and New Zealand to ensure their security against a resurgent Japan. Australian sentiment was against leniency, but Spender used the carrot of a peace treaty and emphasis on the connection between Australia's regional security concerns and the role expected of it by the US and Britain in the defence of the Middle East to get US agreement to an alliance.
In other words, the alliance has been 'threat insensitive'. Although the similarities between Australia and the US can be overstated, 13 they are far greater than exist between the US and its other allies in the region. Australia is also not a great consumer of US defence assets, and the Australian connection has caused the US less trouble than its relations with Japan over Okinawa and the Philippines over the Clarke Air Base. According to the current Australian defence white paper, with the Asia-Pacific region emerging 'as a focus of global security in the coming decades, Maintaining the balance between gain and loss, maximising the benefits of the alliance remains a major challenge for Australia.
An illustrative example of this balancing act relates to the image rather than the substance of alliance relations. ANZUS has enjoyed the support of successive Australian governments which have invested much energy, time and many resources over the years in maintaining and promoting the Treaty and in cultivating the image of the closeness of the Australian-American relationship. Many of the perceived costs and negatives arising from Australia's participation in ANZUS might have been avoided by the exercise of more restraint and better judgement, and by less reliance on unquestioning promotion of the Treaty as the solution to all of Australia's security dilemmas.
Nevertheless, occasionally excessive enthusiasm cannot detract from the central consideration: The foundation stone is the Treaty document for the text of the Treaty see Appendix 1which at 11 articles is quite short in length and, it has been argued, so vague in meaning that it lacks certainty for the parties. The section of the Treaty which is central to the alliance is the first paragraph of Article IV: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
The unspecified action which would be taken by the United States to meet common danger under Article IV has been the subject of much interpretation by Australian governments, the defence bureaucracy, academics and analysts over the life of the alliance. Australian defence policy papers have interpreted possible US assistance in relatively similar fashion, albeit with different emphases over the years. These differing emphases have echoed the increasing weight that successive Australian government white papers and policies have placed on the ability of Australia to defend itself.
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Thus in the s and s the alliance was seen as 'the guarantee of Australia's defence', albeit not an automatic guarantee, but one which required Australia to ensure that the US remained focussed on the region by sending Australian troops to Vietnam and by hosting US defence, communications and intelligence installations 'critical to US global strategic programs and operations. What all these interpretations have in common is the continuing recognition by Australian governments of differing ideologies that the alliance was critically important to Australia's security, and hence that the Treaty remained relevant.
And despite shifting official interpretations, the underlying nature of the Treaty as an insurance policy against aggression remains important, especially in the public consciousness.
It has been argued that Australia's dependence on the US alliance is a sign of foreign and defence policy weakness, that only when Australia is willing to rid itself of ANZUS will it be able to develop truly independent foreign and defence policies, policies that it is assumed would inevitably be better for Australia than those developed as a dependent ally.
This gives no credit to the alliance for providing an environment of security which allowed Australia and Australians to look at the region and their place in the region with a growing sense of confidence rather than with suspicion.
There is no guarantee that without the security that ANZUS has provided Australia would not have developed as an inward looking, less open and secure, more xenophobic society, a sort of apartheid-era South Africa in the South Pacific.
There is no guarantee that without the security that ANZUS has provided Australia would not have developed as an inward looking, less open and more xenophobic society, a sort of apartheid-era South Africa in the South Pacific.
AUSMIN gives Australian governments a formal mechanism for regular bilateral access to the US government at ministerial level and has been judged by successive Australian governments to be a valuable opportunity for wide ranging discussions on a number of issues, and to gain insight to US thinking, especially to changes in its defence policy.
Without the alliance relationship it would be difficult for 'a geographically remote, medium-sized country to secure and keep the attention of a superpower.
The practical and tangible aspect of the alliance is the network of some bilateral legal arrangements, 22 agreements and memoranda of understanding which the ANZUS Treaty has fostered, especially under Article II of the Treaty which deals with effective self help and mutual aid in the maintenance and development of individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
As a result of ANZUS, Australia has privileged access to US military equipment, logistics and technology, as well as the opportunity to train and exercise with the US military and its other allies in the region.
Australia is also part of a quadripartite arrangement known as ABCA America, Britain, Canada and Australia which aims to 'achieve agreed levels of standardisation necessary for two or more ABCA armies to cooperate effectively together within a coalition. The Joint Declaration 'Sydney Statement' which reaffirmed the US-Australian alliance commitments expanded combined exercises and opportunities for training which cover the full range of operational and tactical cooperation and interoperability.
Success in such exercises gives the ADF confidence in its abilities and highlights areas in need of improvement. ADF personnel who acquire knowledge of US defence force practices while on exchange postings or during exercises such as Tandem Thrust gain skills which enhance interoperability between Australian and US forces, as demonstrated most recently during the Interfet operation in East Timor.
Timor In the case of East Timor, the US alliance did not result in the US offering combat troops or 'boots on the ground' for a peace-enforcement mission, as the Australian government reportedly expected. Instead US assistance came in the form of diplomatic and economic pressure on Indonesia to allow the troops of the Australian-led 'coalition of the willing' to enter East Timor without resistance from Indonesian armed forces.
The support that the US gave Australia over East Timor was quite in accordance with ANZUS parties' responsibilities under the Treaty, and Australian planning for the mission was assisted greatly by the close Australian-US military ties developed under the Treaty over the last half century. US-Australian cooperation in the East Timor operation can also be viewed as a positive example of 'burden sharing', one which the US will possibly use as an example for its other allies.
Such 'burden sharing' is quite compatible with the Treaty and the recognition that the two allies have shared and complementary competencies gives the alliance credibility. This is of course no more than a latter-day development of President Nixon's Guam Doctrine, which in essence stated that US allies were expected to make meaningful contributions to their own security and not to 'freeload'. As has been suggested, albeit in another context, from each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs.
The support that the US gave Australia over East Timor was quite in accordance with the ANZUS parties' responsibilities under the Treaty, and Australian planning for the mission was assisted greatly by the close Australian-US military ties developed under the Treaty over the last half century. And whites are more likely than non-whites to say it is more important to have a strong economic relationship with Japan.
Republicans are more likely than Democrats to want better relations with Japan.
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There are no such divisions in Japan about future economic relations with China and the U. Young Japanese are more likely than their elders to back a deeper economic relationship with the U.
Views of young Americans diverge from those of their elders. Yet young Americans are also much more supportive of closer economic ties with China. A Pew Research Center survey provides insight into the Japanese preference for closer economic ties with the U. These perceived national characteristics may or may not be fair or accurate. But they capture a public perception that may help explain national attitudes on a range of other topics.
And three-quarters of Americans see the Japanese as inventive. Most Americans do not ascribe various negative stereotypes to the Japanese. The Japanese tend to be more critical of Americans. Japan, China and the Region U. Americans and Japanese both trust each other more than they trust either China or South Korea.
Meanwhile, both have high levels of confidence in Australia. Moreover, a quarter of Americans and half of Japanese do not trust China at all. There are no significant demographic differences in Japanese views of China.
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Americans and Japanese also differ in their opinions of South Korea. Despite the level of Japanese animosity toward South Korea, there are no significant demographic differences in Japanese views of South Korea.
Both Americans and Japanese overwhelmingly trust Australia, though Americans trust Australia far more intensely. The rise of China as a military and economic power is one of the principal motivating factors driving the U.
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At the same time, the American public is divided over whether Japan should play a more active military role in helping to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region: Americans who trust Japan are more likely to want to see Tokyo play a greater strategic role in the region. And Americans who do not trust China are also more likely to want to see Japan take on more of the military burden in Asia.
In Japan, the generation gap among those who get their international news about the U. A generation gap exists among television viewers as well, although it is much smaller: Whatever their news source, Americans are likely to associate cultural, business, historical and personal connections with Japan.
They also sustain a number of Ghana groups, brass bands, choirs and reception places, and are supported by them in return.
Bilateral Issues Diplomatic relations with Australia were established on 21 September Political relations are currently excellent owing to many shared attitudes and values. Since diplomatic relations were established, relations on the political level developed very warmly, and in certain respects converged on issues of mutual interest and benefit.
This is not only by virtue of the close social connection through Maltese emigration but also due to principles of good governance shared by all members of the Commonwealth Group. The announcement was greatly welcomed by the Maltese Community and in the intervening period there has been a substantial increase in the level of applications for Maltese Citizenship by second generation descendants of Maltese ascendants now eligible for Maltese Citizenship.
It is clear that the strong links that exist between the two countries are underpinned by an ongoing close proximity between Maltese and expatriates residing now in Australia and the level of interest by Australians in Maltese culture. According to the Australian Government Census of Population and Housing in Australia  , Australians claimed Maltese descent with 46, Australian residents having been born in Malta.
Taking into account unreported Maltese ancestry, the number of people of Maltese ancestry in Australia is estimated atThe migrant community in Australia represents the largest Maltese community outside of Malta.
Since first arriving in Australia in the s, the Maltese have contributed greatly to the cultural enrichment and economic development of Australia. During the early part of the twentieth century 1, Maltese immigrated to Australia. In MayAustralia and Malta signed an assisted-migrant-passage agreement, which extended the benefit of subsidised travel costs to over 63, Maltese.