sTALIN EXILED HIS POLITICAL RIVAL, lEON TROTSKY, TO kAZAKHSTAN AND TRACKED HIM DOWN TO MEXICO. tHE kfb KILLED HIM. A detailed account of the struggle that took place between Joseph Stalin and Leon Lev Davidovich Bronstein (he assumed the name Leon Trotsky in ) was . in the Communist Party: "Similarly in the domain of internal party relations we . On the advice of Nikolay Bukharin, all restrictions upon the leasing of land, the. following the Russian Civil War, Trotsky stood second only to Lenin within the . the relationship between him and the Old Guard. .. One must remember that this operation was undertaken on the advice of Stalin, and Lenin.
Jews are now overwhelmingly academics, bankers, businesspeople, lawyers, doctors, journalists, literati and politicians, who do not encourage their children to join the proletariat. Yes, many Jews give the poor much charity and also back assorted social-democratic political formations, but on the whole the Jews are now in the business of preserving the social-political order, rather than turning it on its head.
Stalin banishes Trotsky
In Israel, an unabashedly bourgeois society that once was devoutly socialist is worshiping private enterprise, individualism and hedonism, as the prime minister the people keep reelecting smokes cigars and prides himself in having slashed social spending, sold public companies, and set the market forces loose. Until Russian Jewry was abused. All the lands to their west had abolished all anti-Jewish laws, policies and directives, but the czars continued to cage the Jews in the Pale of Settlement, limit their access to higher education, block their freedom of travel, association and speech, and occasionally also encourage pogroms.
The Jews were provoked, and the revolution was their counterattack. Revolutionary Jews wanted to belong, and some of them wanted to make everyone belong — everywhere and immediately.
It was a utopian urge that makes one suspect Trotsky et al. Whatever its cause, that urge is gone. THERE WAS, of course, an alternative idea, one that promised to make the Jews belong in a different way, an idea that in was juxtaposed with Bolshevism by none other than a typically insightful and visionary Winston Churchill: Russian Jewry went to the Jewish state because here they would be free to study what they wish, live where they please, rise as high as they could climb, and even become defense minister, speaker of the Knesset and chairman of the Jewish Agency.
They knew they would belong. Disagreements came with the evaluation of concrete historical circumstances. When two major battles of the civil war are separated from each other by two or three months, that interval will inevitably he filled in with guerrilla blows against the enemy. It is, of course, not easy to determine the moment of the break. Questions of Boycottism and of guerrilla activities were closely interrelated.
It is permissible to boycott representative assemblies only in the event that the mass movement is sufficiently strong either to overthrow them or to ignore them.
But when the masses are in retreat, the tactic of the boycott loses its revolutionary meaning. Lenin understood that and explained it better than others. As early as he repudiated the boycott of the Duma.
After the coup of June third,he led a resolute fight against the Boycottists precisely because the high-tide had been succeeded by the ebb-tide. At the crest of the civil war guerrilla activities augmented and stimulated the mass movement; in the period of reaction they attempted to replace it, but, as a matter of fact, merely embarrassed the Party and speeded its disintegration. At the same time people at large began to confound revolutionists with ordinary bandits. As an example, I might name Baku and Saratov.
In the vortex of events, which passed him by, Koba could not have failed to seek such means of action as would have enabled him to demonstrate his worth. And yet, it is hard to determine the nature of that participation. He says nothing about it because he knows nothing about it.
Yet during these years Alexinsky was not only very intimate with the Bolshevik Center but was also in touch with Stalin. As a general rule, that muckraker told more than he knew.
Middle Israel: Was the Bolshevik Revolution a Jewish plot? - Opinion - Jerusalem Post
Krupskaya in her turn wrote: All of it was done in secrecy without any fanfare, yet a lot of energy was invested in that cause. But had Koba guided in the Caucasus operations of a similar type, Krassin, Lenin and Krupskaya could not have failed to know about it. Let us see what Iremashvili has to say about it. Political ties between these friends of youthful days terminated at the beginning of the First Revolution. It was only by accident that on the seventeenth of October, on the day the Constitutional Manifesto was published, Iremashvili saw in the streets of Tiflis—only saw, but did not hear—how Koba, hanging onto an iron street lamp on that day everybody climbed up street lampswas haranguing a crowd.
This testimony is therefore obviously unreliable. Iremashvili cites two examples: With reference to the expropriation, which he placed erroneously inIremashvili remarks: He was the instigator of all the crimes, that agitator seething with hatred. Stalin, like all other Bolsheviks, had no influence in Georgia and did not take part either directly or indirectly in that affair.
Yet in its positive aspect, it is virtually meaningless: However, the Mensheviks soon managed to carry out this task themselves. Against the direct resistance of the Menshevik Central Committee, but with the active co-operation of Lenin, the fighting groups of the Party managed to convoke a conference of their own at Tammerfors in November, Among the leading participants of that conference were revolutionists who subsequently played either an important or noticeable role in the Party; such as, Krassin, Yaroslavsky, Zemlyachka, Lalayants, Trilisser, and others.
Stalin is not among them, although at the time he was at liberty in Tiflis. It might be supposed that he preferred not to risk putting in an appearance at the conference because of conspiratorial considerations. This is a vicious libel. But it is dishonorable to throw mud on the basis of rumors, without having any facts. It was no secret that the Bolsheviks as a whole were involved in expropriations: Lenin openly defended expropriation in the press. On the other hand, expulsion from a Menshevik organization could scarcely be regarded by a Bolshevik as a shameful circumstance, especially ten years later.
Besides, to challenge a clever and resourceful opponent to come into court under these conditions meant to risk giving him the chance to try him.
Generally speaking, Martov, carried away by his journalistic temperament and his detestation of the Bolsheviks, had more than once overstepped the pale within which the indubitable nobility of his nature should have confined him.
However, in this instance the point at issue was the trial. Martov remained quite categorical in his affirmation. He demanded that certain witnesses be subpoenaed: In the second place, a group of witnesses headed by Gukovsky, the present Commissar of Finance, under whose chairmanship was tried the case of the attempted assassination of the worker Zharinov, who, before the Party organization, had exposed the Baku committee and its leader, Stalin, as being connected with an expropriation.
But it was possible to pose the question of whether to accept them back in the organization. Direct expulsion could be meted out only to those instigators who remained in the ranks of the Party. But there were apparently no direct incriminations of Koba. It is therefore possible that to a certain extent Martov was right when he affirmed that Koba had been expelled: But Stalin was also right: It was not easy for the tribunal to make head or tail of this, especially in the absence of witnesses. Stalin objected to their being subpoenaed, pleading the difficulty and the unreliability of communications with the Caucasus in those crucial days.
It is impossible not to pause with apprehension at the mention of the attempt on the life of the worker Zharinov for his protest against expropriations. Although we know nothing at all about that episode, it throws off an ominous reflection into the future. In the Menshevik Dan wrote that expropriators like Ordzhonikidze and Stalin in the Caucasus provided the Bolshevik faction with the wherewithal; but this is merely a repetition of what Martov had said, and undoubtedly on the basis of the same sources.
No one informs us of anything concrete. Stalin himself has never, anywhere, said anything at all, not so much as a word, about his fighting adventures. It is hard to say why. He was never distinguished by autobiographical modesty. What he deems inconvenient to tell, others do by his orders. The former fighters contributed nothing about it in print during that period when Stalin was not yet the inspirer and the controller of historical reminiscences.
His reputation as organizer of fighting activities does not find support in any other documents: True, Stalin has a firm grip on the police records. But if the gendarme archives contained in them any concrete data about Djugashvili as an expropriator, the punishments to which he had been subjected would have been immeasurably more stringent than they were.
Of alf the hypotheses, only one has some verisimilitude. It was impossible to check up on him under the conditions of underground conspiracy.
Hence, the absence of his further interest in disclosures of details. On the other hand, the actual participants in expropriations and persons close to him do not mention Koba in their reminiscences, only because they have nothing to say. Others did the fighting; Stalin supervised them from afar. Concerning the London Congress Ivanovich wrote the following in his illegal Baku newspaper: Of the Menshevik resolutions, only the resolution on guerrilla activities was passed, and that only accidentally: Moreover, there were very sharp disagreements among the Bolsheviks themselves on the question of expropriations.
Yet it would be erroneous to assume that the author of the article had simply talked too much without any ulterior motives. As a matter of fact, he found it necessary to derogate the restrictive decision of the Congress in the eyes of the fighters.
That, of course, does not render the explanation itself any the less senseless. And not infrequently the very obvious crudity of his arguments does just that, freeing him from the necessity to seek more profound motives. For the next fighting operation that was sufficient. At ten forty-five in the morning on the twelfth of June [, in the Erivan Square of Tiflis, an exceptionally daring armed attack took place on a convoy of Cossacks that accompanied an equipage transporting a bag of money.Lenin & Trotsky - Their Rise To Power I WHO DID WHAT IN WW1?
The course of the operation was calculated with the precision of clockwork. Several bombs of exceptional strength were thrown in a set rotation. There were numerous revolver shots. The bag of moneyrubles vanished with the revolutionists. Not a single one of the fighters was caught by the police.
Three members of the convoy were left dead on the spot; about fifty persons were wounded, most of them slightly. At a critical moment, when it might seem that alf was lost, the pseudo-officer took hold of the bag of money with amazing self possession and temporarily hid it in a couch belonging to the director of the observatory, the same one in which the youthful Koba had at one time worked as a bookkeeper.
This leader was the Armenian fighter Petrosyan, who bore the alias Kamo. Having come to Tiflis at the end of the preceding century, he fell into the hands of propagandists, among them Koba. Knowing almost no Russian, Petrosyan once asked Koba again: She says nothing more about the relations of these two people. But she does tell about the touching attachment of Kamo for Lenin, whom he visited for the first time in in Finland.
He was passionately attached to Ilyich, Krassin and Bogdanov … He made friends with my mother, told her about his aunt and about his sisters. Kamo often went from Finland to Petersburg, always taking his weapons with him, and each time, with special care, mother would tie his revolvers on his back. Shortly before the Tiflis expropriation, Kamo again visited the staff in Finland.
A chemist by education, Leonid, when still a student, dreamed of bombs the size of a nut. The year gave him an opportunity to extend his research in that direction. True, he never succeeded in making one of those ideal dimensions, but the laboratories under his supervision produced bombs of great devastating force. This was not the first time that the fighters tested them on a square in Tiflis. After the expropriation Kamo appeared in Berlin.
There he was arrested upon the denunciation of the provocateur Zhitomirsky, who occupied a prominent place in the foreign organization of the Bolsheviks.
During the arrest the Prussian police seized his suitcase, in which presumably bombs and revolvers were discovered. Kamo remained in a German prison more than a year and a half, continuously simulating violent insanity upon the advice of Krassin. As an incurable madman he was surrendered to Russia, and spent another year and a half in Metekh Castle in Tiflis, subjected to the most trying tests. Declared finally hopelessly insane, Kamo was transferred to a psychiatric hospital, from which he escaped.
Kamo suffered frightfully because of the split that occurred between Lenin on the one hand, Bogdanov and Krassin on the other. Then follows an idyll: Kamo asked that almonds be brought to him, sat in the kitchen, which was also the dining room, ate almonds, as in his native Caucasus, and related the story of the frightful years, told how he simulated madness and how he had tamed a swallow while in prison.
The manifesto issued inon the occasion of the three hundredth anniversary of the Romanov dynasty, brought an unexpected commutation to lifelong hard labor in place of the gibbet. Four years later the February Revolution brought him unexpected liberation.
The October Revolution brought power to the Bolsheviks. But it threw Kamo out of his rut. He was like a mighty fish flung out on the shore.
Besides, the frightful years he had endured had not passed without taking their toll. Most likely a member of the new bureaucracy sat in that automobile.
Kamo was wending his way through the darkness on a modest bicycle: The very way he perished is symbolic. The struggle against the iron tyranny of Fascism will undoubtedly bring out among the revolutionary fighters of the West all those traits which in Kamo so astonish the skeptical Philistine.
The historical process is far more complex than a superficial rationalist would wish to believe it. In any event, during the Soviet epoch Stalin never confirmed or denied these rumors. Evidently he was not at all opposed to having the tragic romanticism of expropriations connected with his name in the consciousness of the youth. However, a closer study of the circumstances of those days compels me to revise my view of the traditional version.
An old militant, well informed about the activities of that period writes: Another former militant states: It undoubtedly follows from these omissions that Koba was not in direct contact with the members of the detachments, did not instruct them, consequently was not the organizer of the act in the real sense of the word, let alone a direct participant. The Congress in London came to an end on April twenty-seventh. Stalin had too little time left between his return from abroad and the day of the expropriation to supervise the preparation of such a complicated enterprise.
It is more likely that the fighters had been selected and had been drawn together in the course of several preceding reckless adventures. Some of them might have had doubts as to how Lenin would look upon expropriations. The fighters were waiting for the signal. Stalin might have brought them that signal. But did his participation go beyond that? Hence, there was even less than a month and a half from the time it came to an end and the Tiflis expropriation.
We know virtually nothing about the relations of Kamo and Koba. Kamo was inclined to attach himself to people. Yet no one speaks of his attachment to Koba. The reticence about their relations leads one to think that there was no attachment; that, rather, there were conflicts. Who needed them and for what purpose? The documents, as well as the man who absconded with them, disappeared without a trace.
Would it be too hasty to presume that through one of his agents Stalin had snatched from Kamo certain evidence which for one reason or another he found disturbing? That does not exclude, of course, the possibility of close collaboration between them in June, Moreover, the adviser might have fostered abroad a highly colored version of his own role.
Yet Stalin will not hesitate to do even the latter. But the reference to the Berlin journey commands our attention all the more, because in the dialogue with Ludwig, Stalin also refers to his having been in Berlin in Why did these negotiations take place in Berlin and not in London? It is quite likely that Lenin might have deemed it careless to meet with Ivanovich in London, where he was in full sight of the other delegates and of numerous tsarist and other spies attracted by the Congress.
It is also possible that a third person, who had nothing to do with the Congress, was supposed to participate in these conferences.
Middle Israel: Was the Bolshevik Revolution a Jewish plot?
The chronology of these meetings is very significant: That sufficiently determines their purpose. The second meeting was in all likelihood concerned with the problem: The distance separating these two men precluded personal friendship.
But it would seem that just about that time they did begin to know each other. If the assumption is warranted that Lenin had previously made arrangements with Koba about plans for the Tiflis expropriation, then it was quite natural for him to have been filled with admiration for the man he regarded as the organizer of that coup. Enthusiasm for people who showed resoluteness, or were simply successful in carrying out an operation assigned to them, was highly characteristic of Lenin to the very end of his life.
Above all, he prized men of action. The Tiflis booty brought no good. The entire sum consisted of five-hundred ruble notes. It was impossible to circulate currency of such large denomination. After the adverse publicity received by the unfortunate skirmish in Erivan Square, it was senseless to try to exchange these bills at any Russian bank.
The operation was transferred abroad. But the provocateur Zhitomirsky, who warned the police about it betimes, participated in the organization of the exchange operations.
The future Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov was arrested while attempting to exchange them in Paris. All they talked about was the Russian expropriators. They talked about it with horror at the hoarding house where Ilyich and I took our meals. Lenin could not help but see that the insurrection had been shoved ahead into the hazy future. As far as he was concerned, the problem consisted this time only of a simple attempt to assure financial means to the Party at the expense of the enemy, for the impending period of uncertainty.
The case with Stalin was different. Broad historical considerations had little value in his eyes. The resolution of the London Congress was only an irksome scrap of paper, to be nullified by means of a crude trick.
Success would justify the risk. Souvarine argues that it is not fair to shift responsibility from the leader of the faction to a secondary figure. There is no question here of shifting responsibility.
At the time, the majority of the Bolshevik faction was opposed to Lenin on the question of expropriations. The Bolsheviks, in direct contact with the fighting detachments, had extremely convincing observations of their own, which Lenin, again an emigrant, did not have. Without corrections from below, the leader of the greatest genius is bound to make crude errors.
The fact remains that Stalin was not among those who understood the inadmissibility of guerrilla actions under conditions of revolutionary retreat. And that was no accident. To him the Party was first of all a machine. The machine required financial means in order to exist. The financial means could be obtained with the aid of another machine, independent of life and of the struggle of the masses. There Stalin was in his own element.
The consequences of this tragic adventure, which rounded out an entire phase of Party life, were rather serious. The fight over the Tiflis expropriation poisoned relations inside the Party and inside the Bolshevik faction itself for a long time to come.
No one was expelled. No one was mentioned by name. In the meantime, the disintegration of revolutionary organizations proceeded apace.
They declared the illegal Party liquidated once and for all, and the aim to restore it—a reactionary utopia. Entrenching themselves in trade unions, educational clubs and insurance societies, they carried on their work as cultural propagandists, not as revolutionists. To safeguard their jobs in the legal organizations, the officials from among the workers began to resort to protective coloration.
They avoided the strike struggle, so as not to compromise the scarcely tolerated trade unions. In practice, legality at any price meant outright repudiation of revolutionary methods. The Liquidators were in the forefront during the most desolate years. They were the cocks of the walk and they crowed about it. Bolshevism seemed definitely doomed. The perspectives and the slogans of the Liquidators proved to be the reactionary utopia. Even the party of the liberals was refused registration. Meantime, at the opposite pole to the Liquidators, in the left wing of the Bolshevik faction, an extremist group formed, which stubbornly refused to recognize the altered situation and continued to defend the tactic of direct action.
After the elections, the differences of opinion that arose on the question of boycotting the Duma led to the formation of the Recallist faction, which called for the recall of the Social-Democratic deputies from the Duma. The Recallists were undoubtedly the symmetrical supplement of the Liquidators. The period of dynamite laboratories still exerted its powerful influence upon Krassin.
That shrewd and sensible man joined for a time the sect of Recallists, in order to abandon the Revolution altogether for years to come. With the break-up of this secret triumvirate the old top leadership of Bolshevism fell apart. But Lenin did not budge. In the summer of the majority of the faction was for the boycott. By the spring of the Recallists were already a minority in Petersburg and Moscow. Koba speedily took that into account. His unfortunate experience with the agrarian program, when he had come out openly against Lenin, made him more circumspect.
Noiselessly and unobtrusively, he reneged on his fellow-boycotters. From then on his regular behavior at each turn was to keep out of sight and keep quiet while changing his stand. The continued splintering of the Party into petty groups, which waged ruthless battles in a vacuum, aroused in sundry factions a longing for reconciliation, for agreement, for unity at any price.
That will have to he discussed, however briefly, so as to facilitate understanding of the subsequent conflict between Stalinism and Trotskyism. In —that is, from the moment differences of opinion arose as to the nature of the liberal bourgeoisie—I broke with the Minority of the Second Congress [The Mensheviks] and during the ensuing thirteen years belonged to no faction.
Stalin banishes Trotsky - HISTORY
My position on the intra-party conflict came down to this: Certain critics of Bolshevism to this day regard my old conciliationism as the voice of wisdom. Yet its profound erroneousness had been long ago demonstrated both in theory and practice. But where is the guaranty that this artificially drawn diagonal line will coincide with the needs of objective development?
The task of scientific politics is to deduce a program and a tactic from an analysis of the struggle of classes, not from the [ever-shifting] parallelogram of such secondary and transitory forces as political factions. True, the position of the reaction was such that it cramped the political activity of the entire Party within extremely narrow limits.
Yet it was precisely during the period of reaction that the revolutionary party was unable to train its cadres without a major perspective. The preparation for tomorrow was a most important element in the policy of today. The policy of conciliation thrived on the hope that the course of events itself would prompt the necessary tactic.
Most consistently of all was Conciliationism expressed by Trotsky, about the only one who tried to provide a theoretical foundation for that policy. But in his crusade against that dangerous tendency he felt he had the right not to make any distinction between its subjective sources. On the contrary, he attacked with redoubled ferocity those Conciliators whose basic positions were closest to Bolshevism.
Quotations from that violent polemic were later to render Stalin a service for which they were certainly not intended. For Lenin, the same expression meant: But Lenin understood much more correctly the objective course of development in Germany as well as in Russia: As for Koba, he knew neither French nor German. Koba did not seek the open arena, like the orators and journalists of Menshevism, because the open arena exposed his weak rather than his strong attributes. He needed above all a centralized machine.
Although Koba lacked historical perspective, he was more than amply endowed with perseverance. During the years of reaction he was not one of the tens of thousands who deserted the Party, but one of the very few hundreds who, despite everything, remained loyal to it. Koba remained in Russia.
Subsequently he credited that to himself as an extraordinary achievement. As a matter of fact, it was nothing of the kind. The selection of place and nature of work depended to a very minor extent on the choice of the individual in question.