In the philosophy of language, the distinction between concept and object is attributable to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege. Overview. According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists Frege, G. ” On Concept and Object”, originally published as “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand” in. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. Original: “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand”, in Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie XVI (): –;; In English: “Concept. Download Citation on ResearchGate | Kerry und frege über begriff und gegenstand 1 | After describing the philosophical background of Kerry’s work, an account.
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Reprinted in LU and KStr. Verlag Mentis GabrielG.
On frebe a reading, however, it is difficult to see why Frege was not troubled by the obvious analogous problem arising for extensions of concepts in the Grundgesetze. At this time, the linguistic and philosophical underpinnings of begriffsschrift, as well as the description of the language itself, are still somewhat imprecise.
After his immigration to the United StatesCarnap, with Alonzo Church, was instrumental in keeping Fregean ideas in logic alive in the United States where they came to flourish, for instance, in the work in semantics of David Kaplan and Richard Montague.
Already in the Begriffsschrift important preliminary theorems, for example a generalized form of law of trichotomywere derived within what Frege understood to be pure logic. Derived using concept-scriptOxford: Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik.
Bwgriff distinction leads to the famous difficulty or “awkwardness of language” that some expressions which purport to signify a concept — Frege’s example is “the concept horse ” — are grammatically expressions that by his criterion signify an Object. The case is special because what is here being called the extension of a predicate, or a set, is only one type of “value-range” of a function.
Having vigorously criticized a selection of philosophical views about the notion of number notably John Stuart Mill ‘s empiricist and Kant’s transcendentalist viewsFrege, in the second part of that work, provides an informal, yet rigorous outline of how the reduction of arithmetic to logic may actually be carried out. Geach in Geach Geach and Black  pp. These distinctions were disputed by Bertrand Russell, especially in his paper ” On Denoting “; the controversy has continued into the present, fueled especially by Saul Kripke ‘s famous lectures ” Naming and Necessity “.
Putnam CUP, pp. Kluge Yale University Press,pp. Find it on Scholar. Philosophy of mathematicsmathematical logicphilosophy of language. The Editor of the Rivista di Matematica was G.
A logic-mathematical enquiry into the concept of numberOxford: He is understood by many to be the father of analytic philosophyconcentrating on the philosophy of language and mathematics.
Frege sketches a proof for this remaining axiom, which ultimately consists in showing by means of induction that, for any natural number nthe number belonging to the concept “object to which n bears the transitive reflexive closure of the successor relation” i.
Language, Thought, and Logic: Frege carefully distinguishes between basic laws axioms on the one hand, and inference rules on the other hand.
In addition, the two corresponded rather extensively uhd to ; it is gegenstanf from this correspondence that Frege and Wittgenstein thought highly of each other the end of the correspondence is marked by an exchange of rather critical remarks by Frege on the Tractatus and by Wittgenstein on “Der Gedanke”. Carnap attended these lectures and took notes.
Felix Meiner HermesH. Though largely ignored during his lifetime, Giuseppe Peano — and Bertrand Russell — introduced his work to later generations of logicians and philosophers. Presumably he had planned a third volume, which, however, never appeared. Thomae’s Holiday Causerie ,” in CPpp.
A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number Complete translation by J. Extracts in TPWpp. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege – – W. Crispin Wright’s neologicism, especially as subsequently articulated and criticized by George S. In the last year of his life, at the age betriff 76, his diary contains extreme right-wing political opinions, opposing the parliamentary system, democrats, beggiff, Catholics, the French and Jews, who he thought ought to be deprived of political rights and, preferably, expelled from Germany.
Psychologische und logische Untersuchung. Frege observes that this definition allows for a rather straightforward proof of the mathematical induction principle for natural numbers.
Concept and object – Wikipedia
Scholarly discussion continues whether Frege considered the senses of unsaturated expressions to be functions, or whether he regarded all senses as objects a stance suggested by the fact that every sense can be referred to by means of a singular nominal phrase of the form “the sense of the expression X”.
Beaney in Beaney  pp. The system of the Grundgesetze entails that the set thus characterised both is and is not a member of itself, and is thus inconsistent.
Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary. Written by Professor Dr.