In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an innovation or ‘significance’, but rendered by Frege’s translators as ‘reference ‘, ‘referent’, ‘Meaning’, ‘nominatum’, etc. Frege introduced the notion of “sense” ( German: Sinn) to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. On Sense and Reference. Gottlob Frege. Equality* gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation. Phil Language. Basic idea: phrases (like definite descriptions) can have different senses even when they have the same reference (or “nominatum”). 1. Sense.
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Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference”
How, as it is put, can the one have a different “cognitive value” from the other? Chen Xiaoping – – Frontiers of Philosophy in China 7 2: Because Frege used definite descriptions in many of his examples, he is often taken to have endorsed the descriptivist theory. Science Logic and Mathematics. The reference or “referent”; Bedeutung of a proper name is the object it means or indicates bedeutenits sense Sinn is what the name expresses.
The sentences “Hesperus is a planet” and “Phosphorous is a planet” also have different “cognitive values” in German ” Erkenntniswert “, literally: Alan Schwerin – – Dialectica 42 3: It is possible for a name to have sense without having a reference.
On sense and nominatum
Bycie w perspektywie analitycznej. In the middle of the paragraph, beginning with the words, “But this relation would hold Philosophy of language Philosophical logic Conceptual distinctions Meaning philosophy of language.
The reference of a name is the name’s bearer: The term ‘reference’ has been the most widely adopted, but this fails to capture the meaning of the original German ‘meaning’ or ‘significance’and does not reflect the decision to standardise key terms across different editions of Frege’s works published by Blackwell.
To be kind, it is not obvious what argument Frege is giving here. For our purposes, we need not consider the details of this argument, but my own view, for what it is worth, is that Fege reasons are ultimately logical in character: Evans further developed this line, arguing that a sense without a referent was not possible.
Frege then turns to the question what we should regard as the sense and reference, not of a name, but of a whole declarative sentence. So the reference of the name “Gottlob Frege” is Gottlob Frege, that very person. This area will be used by the assessor to leave comments related to this criterion.
Only when the empty place is filled by a proper name does the reference of the completed sentence — its truth value — appear. Aspects of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind categorize this paper.
For example, someone other than Richard Nixone. Any major changes could affect their assessment nomiinatum. Added to PP index Total downloads 5of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 1of 2, How can I increase my downloads? University of Chicago Press, What does the way Frege argues here tell us about how he is thinking about ‘sense’?
Rather, there will be a difference in cognitive value only if there is a difference in the “mode of presentation”, which Frege illustrates using a geometrical example. Frege then argues that the thought “contained” in a sentence cannot be its reference.
A Solution to the Kirkpe-Burge Conflict. Views Read Edit View history. The central purpose of this paper is to establish a distinction between the reference of an expression—primarily, a proper name—and what Frege calls its sense. To what assumptions about thoughts and references does it appeal? One might find inspiration for such an alternative in what Frege said earlier about indirect speech.