Some people wonder whether the scientific approach to psychology is necessary . Can we not reach the same conclusions based on common sense or intuition?. In a wilderness of common sense, science stands a lonely pinnacle exhibit a close relationship to reality (but with objectivity we try our best). James accepted parts of common sense psychology and its mentalist the relationship between common sense parlance, scientific language, and reality.
Controls Science controls for possibly extraneous sources of influence. The lay public does not control for such possibilities, and therefore the chains of causation and explanation become tangled.
When trying to explain a phenomena, science rigorously excludes factors that may affect an outcome so that it can be sure where the real relationships are. Common sense has no such control. The person who believes that a full moon increases the rate of crime does not control this hypothesis. Without control they may never see that statistics speak to the contrary. Assuming a connection is never as meaningful as proving one.
Common sense does not. Common sense leads us to believe that giving children sugar causes them to be more hyper. Science shows us that this is not the case. When we use science to actually establish causation, it is for the betterment of society. For a long time the tobacco industry would have us believe that smoking did not lead to lung cancer, it is merely a correlation. Medical science has now shown unequivocally that smoking causes lung cancer.
How could common sense ever lead us to this healthy conclusion? Would common sense ever intuit that smoke hurts your lungs or that it contains harmful chemicals? People who began smoking 60 years ago had no clue that it was harmful.
Even children smoked back then. Could common sense ever grasp the methodological measures required to prove such a harmful connection?
I do not think so. That which cannot be observed at least tangentially or tested is of no concern to science. This is why religious-based explanations of scientific concepts, i. Ghosts and goblins may be thought to be the causes of many a shenanigan, but their reluctance to be tested or observed renders them, at least scientifically, non-existent. If they have no effects that cannot be explained naturally, if they are invisible, if they interact with no one and are only revealed in anecdotes, what is the difference between those qualities and non-existence?
Metaphysical explanations so far offer nothing to the understanding of the natural world. Common sense invokes them heavily, see the problem? It did not lead us to invent microwaves, planes, space shuttles, cell phones, satellites, particle accelerators, or skyscrapers, nor did it to the discovery of other galaxies, cures for infectious disease, or radioactivity, science did. Everything that makes your life better than those who came before us is due to science.
You may amble your way through life, with a common sense master, assuming connections and learning little, but only a scientific structure of thought will teach you about the universe.
And what else could you do with your short time in the sun other than contribute to human understanding of the greatest mysteries? I shall skip the details 5but the essence is this.
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As for Churchland we have seen this already. Jackson says, for instance: For Jackson, it is not so much the form that is important for the theoretical character of the commonsense conception, but the fact that the commonsense views are founded and that explanations and predictions are not guesses ibid.
On the other hand, Churchland stresses particularly the similarity in structure between the commonsense conception and a scientific theory Churchland What is ignored in such views, however, is that explaining and predicting on the basis of commonsense views is different in character from explaining and predicting on the basis of a causal or nomic theory.
To show this, I shall take the case of predicting. We can make predictions based on a causal and nomic theory and on our commonsense views. If a scientific theoretical prediction does not come true, we say that the prediction is false.Sociology for UPSC : Socio and Common Sense - Chapter 1 - Paper 1 - Lecture 51
We then doubt the correctness of the theory behind the prediction or at least the methods used. Predicting from our commonsense views is different. Of course it may well be that our commonsense views are false and that for this reason our predictions do not come true.
But even if our commonsense views are correct and have been proved so in the past, it is still possible that our predictions do not hold good in new cases. For example, we expect that somebody will do something from habit but he does something different: We think that it is normal that the persons we deal with keep their appointments, but Peter sometimes does and sometimes does not.
Or we watch a football match and it strikes us that the offside rule is not applied. Later a friend tells us that the rule was inoperative.
Communicating Science: The Difference Between Science and Common Sense | Science-Based Life
The match was an experiment. However, such cases are not falsifications of our commonsense views, nor do they call for adjustment of them. The fact is that the relation of our commonsense conception to reality simply is different from the relation of a scientific theory to reality.
If in the case of a scientific theory the reality is not as supposed, it has repercussions on the theory. But if the reality does not correspond to our commonsense views, it tells us something about the reality itself. A person has changed his opinion because from now on he behaves differently and because our former predictions no longer come true. Likewise a person is unreliable just because our predictions of his behaviour are sometimes correct and sometimes not.
And the football match where the offside rule is not applied though the rule has not been abolished for normal matches is called by us an experiment just for this reason cf. These examples show that our commonsense views as such can be true while they may not always hold good. But then it is not the truth of these views that is at issue, as in the case of a scientific theory, but what Apel calls their applicability cf.
To return to our language example. We see something like this also in the case of our commonsense conception. In other words, we give our social reality a certain meaning based on our commonsense views and on certain expectations predictions that result from them, and it is this that determines what the reality is for us.
Those who consider our commonsense conception to be a theory analogous to a scientific theory do not see that the meaning we assign on the basis of our commonsense conception is different from the meaning we assign to reality if we interpret it theoretically.
They ignore the difference between meaning 0 and meaning 1. The former is the meaning we assign in order to constitute our own reality to which we have a subjective relation; the latter is the meaning we assign in order to get to know a reality including a social reality that already exists by describing and explaining it. As social scientists, we have or try to have an objective relation to this reality, just as grammarians have an objective relation to the implicit grammar they describe.
This is exemplified by the fact that a scientific theory usually employs a terminology that is not employed by agents as such when they act, just as in the case of an explicit grammar.
Communicating Science: The Difference Between Science and Common Sense
Phrased in terms of the difference between meaning 1 and meaning 0: Practice as mediation of meaning 0 Seen in this way, the commonsense conception in conjunction with the meaning 0 assignments based on it is of course nothing but a practice cf. According to Churchland, however, this does not make a theory different from the commonsense conception: In fact, also science is a practice and scientists assign a certain meaning 0 to what they do bij de Weg Since Kuhn, we have known that what counts as a valid interpretation of reality is subject to change.
What is not subject to change, however, is the object of interpretation as such. Since Darwin developed his theory of evolution, the origin of life has not moved up to the past, but we have moved it up to the past.
But the practice of a scientist is not the reality that is studied with the help of a theory; that reality is a reality the scientific investigator is objectively opposite to. The scientific practice is a practice that makes this objectification possible and determines the rules for it. That these rules can change does not alter this fact. However, in the case of the commonsense conception the bearer of this conception the counterpart of the scientist is himself a part of the reality to which this conception refers.
The bearer of the commonsense conception is subject in this reality and the practice coincides with the reality to which it refers. A gesture, for example as a gesture and not merely as a movementcannot be seen in isolation from the commonsense view of the bearer of this view; for example, a gesture that to the Dutch is a signal to go away, is to the Greeks a request to come nearer. It cannot be that one makes a prediction on the basis of a scientific theory and that the prediction is fulfilled or otherwise by the object of the prediction because of the existence of the prediction.
Stars do not explode because we have predicted it: But such effects do occur if people know that we have predicted or foreseen that they will behave in a certain way.
For example, if the organizers of a demonstration expect many people to participate, this may come true because on hearing this expectation, nobody will fear that they will be part of a minority and everybody will want to be able to say that they participated. In another situation, fewer people than expected may turn up, because many may think: The basic idea is as follows.
Suppose a group of psychologists investigates how certain stimuli from the environment are causal factors that make agents believe certain things and behave accordingly. Let us suppose that one of the members of the research group really does so, and that she takes the way her colleagues in the investigation develop their scientific beliefs as causally determined by relevant stimuli from the environment. Then this psychologist does keep to the scientific theoretical practice in the sense that she let us suppose draws valid conclusions on the base of a valid theory according to scientifically accepted norms, but it will be clear that by taking what her colleagues do as causally determined the psychologist can no longer have a communicative relation with them.
This is what we can conclude from these cases. The occurrence of Merton effects shows that the practice upon which the development of scientific theories is based is different from the practice of our commonsense conception.
In the first practice, the subjects of knowledge, who are the bearers of the practice at the same time, are separate from the objects of knowledge. What the case of the investigating psychologists shows is that the practice of the commonsense conception precedes the practice of scientific theory.
Meaning assignment takes place each time we approach reality. This was what Hesse concluded. This way of assigning meaning assignment of meaning 1 is reflected in a certain practice.
Churchland was right in arguing that. Our commonsense conception is a part of the reality. As such it is continuously confronted with other commonsense conceptions. Therefore, assignment of meaning 0 is not a one-sided process, as it is in the case of theoretical interpretation where the scientist is opposite to the reality, and where the subject of knowledge is opposite to the object of knowledge. It is a process of mediation with other commonsense conceptions of other subjects of knowledge.
Perhaps he simply has other views about what an appointment is because he has a different cultural background. The confrontation of both commonsense conceptions requires mediation in order to understand each other and in order to make clear what the problem is and how it must be solved.
More exactly, it requires mediation between the two frames of understanding. But this example also shows what mediation between commonsense conceptions is: